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Emergency Response: Clustering Change
G€unther Bachmann
Abstract Truth is always concrete, as are emergencies. If truth and reliability of
good decisions is what, in general, nourishes change and the readiness of people to
trust in transformation, emergency response should be at the heart of this.
Responding to emergency situations is about immediate decisions and action. If
carried out incorrectly or badly performed, it not only fails in substance, but is
likely to destroy and delegitimise any further attempts to transform constraints and
contingencies which have caused the emergency situation in the first place.
Neither the recent debates on international environmental governance nor those
focusing on the multilateral governance framework for sustainable development,
emphasise the issue of emergency response. This reluctance is most likely due to
the fact that dealing with emergency control is still regarded as a strictly national
task. This article believes that this approach is inadequate. It argues that the
character of emergencies is changing. Whereas conventional emergencies are
mostly local, it is clear that limited and calculable nuclear accidents and the adverse
effects of climate change, demonstrate that the modern generation of emergencies
has the potential to surpass geographic limits, national borders and to be long term.
Therefore, this article argues that emergency control may have an important role in
clustering change processes and transition efforts, at least under certain conditions
and whilst framed by the concept of transgovernance.
6.1 Emergency Response: Triggering Change?
We may speak of an emergency when a situation or a disastrous event cause great
damage, destruction and human suffering, and overwhelms local capacity,
necessitating a request to national or international emergency response capacities.
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A disaster is often caused by nature (blizzard, hurricane, floodings, earthquake,
tsunami, drought), but can also have human origins (e.g. chemical spills, nuclear
incident, climate impact irregularities and climate engineering), and in particular
the emergency implications of a disaster are increasingly determined by social and
economic factors and the vulnerability of human settlements. The emergency itself
is of unforeseen and often of a sudden nature. The extent to what the emergency has
been unforseeable in substance and in process is subject to scientific and social
debate, but is not substantial for the definition.
If successfully carried out, emergency response delivers ‘hard’ solutions while the
‘sustainable development’ delivers ‘soft’ aspiration and bearing points in a broader
sense. Both are connected. This connection is neither merely circumstantial nor is it
hard wired. It is rather a soft binding or coupling, making the connection by learning
and accepting (or opening) new choices and new lines of responsibility through
knowledge based informed debates. If however this reflexivity cannot be achieved,
action might fail both regarding the aspect of the practical problem on the ground as
well as the wider aspect of building societal values towards a sustainable future.
Sustainable Development is a societal aspiration which invites and involves
people to share their values and to empower their abilities and competences for a
better future. However, it can never be as concrete as the striking problems which it
sets out to remedy. There is a two anchor process of change: the first is driven by the
urgency of today’s problems and those of the foreseeable future, whilst the other is
enforced by the aspiration of people and their thinking with regards to fundamental
issues of human life, nature and prosperity.
Emergencies have the potential to play a major role in change processes. This
assumption sounds strange, at first glance.1 Change processes often rely on design
whilst emergencies do not. Emergencies happen haphazardly and at random, not by
design. Change is perceived as a rather long term lineup of a multitude of steps
whilst emergencies involve individuals. Change and transition are often perceived
as a function of time. They assume at least some kind of stretched time line or even
linearity. Emergencies on the other hand, with their emphasis on the ‘now and here’
are quite the opposite. In terms of governance issues, change is seen as something
which one can manage (you can manage what you can measure, or: what you can
measure gets done). In trying to define the rationality of change processes, devel-
opment is often back cast when focus is on these characteristics. Emergencies,
however, do not fit into this kind of rationale.
1 Of course, any disaster, whether natural or human, certainly creates opportunities for change. The
question always as to what is the power angle of change and who is benetting from it. The power
aspect of disasters is very well discussed by Naomi Klein (2007: 558). The book elaborates on the
assumption that the radical neoliberal free market policies, in some countries, were pushed through
while people were scared by disasters or upheavals. The author implies that lobby groups may
have intentionally created some of these man-made crises in order to push through unpopular
economic reforms. I mention this book as a reference to the change-agent-character of
emergencies although I see it oversimplifying the case. One may not too ready see conspiracies
where all-too-human pattern of confusion and helplessness, good intentions and greed may as well
give a sound explanation.
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Whether or not they contribute to change processes depends on how societies react
to emergencies. Any society perceives risks as the realisation of possible future
emergencies which should be avoided at all costs. The way societies assess these
risks is not a matter of physical patterns alone, nor are they the most important part.
Technical and social factors are interwoven. Most important is whether a society sees
alternatives – technical and social – to avoid or mitigate these risks. The existence of
alternatives is fundamental for the scale and extent to which risks are perceived.
Modern emergencies mean that this relation becomes increasingly complex.
Emergencies which result from risks and challenges in modern societies, are
beyond those which can be pre-calculated. An example of this type of emergency
would be a major nuclear accident. They are without pre-set geographic limits and
their materiality may easily develop un-predictable (and most probably unmanage-
able) features. What is more, geographic distances do not translate into social
distances; with the opposite more likely to be the case. All of this is demonstrated
by the German case in dealing with the Fukushima meltdown.
Another feature adds to this perception of risks and emergencies. It comes with
the era of sustainability as policy concept and refers to the character of information
and values. The contemporary context seems to accept social values only if they
imply a shared meaning (and risks are perceived as something which bear a
collective meaning beyond the actual physical impact). Information, in this respect,
is only then socially accepted as information if it is based on open sources. If this is
not the case, information is simply data and its relevance to public decision-making
is denied or under doubt (in ’t Veld 2010). Successful emergency response is
deemed to be based on open-source information.2
Amidst the wide array of environmental and social problems – both global and
regional – emergencies call for immediate action and the ethics of help, remedy and
facilitation of new thinking. They do not necessarily call for textbook solutions.
Emergency response is designed to manage the unexpected, and if this does not
happen, then it has failed. Occasionally, the urgency of the situation at hand
requires taking action which may contradict the usual logic of procedures without
waiting for decisions to be taken by the regular chain of command. Whether this
works out or not, is subject to the situational intelligence of those in command.
Whether decision routines, both in the public and private sector, are ready to
perform transformative action, is characterised to no small extent by the after-
event reaction of the governance routine: will it punish or learn? Will it punish
those in charge for any mistakes or inappropriate behaviour which might have
caused or influenced the situation? Or will it use mistakes in order to learn how to
perform better in times of stress, and how to make better use of the knowledge
2 In Germany, the Fukushima event caused meaningful political decision taking. The report Ethics
Committee which was in the process of being established right after the initial nuclear accident in
Japan, built its report on the facts elaborated here. Most important was the checking of scientific
facts and figures which could only then be operational for building consensus when information is
based on open sources. Non disclosed information will fail even if the data turns out to be adequate
(Ethik-Kommission Sichere Energieversorgung 2011).
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available for disaster control, forecast and precaution action? Will it develop
reflectivity or prolong any command-and-control mechanics which it had in place
before? Would the dominant reaction display a reflexive or a compressed attitude:
readiness to u-turn and change mode as opposed to the fortress attitude of simply
building higher walls when under attack? Will it emphasise openness and reflexiv-
ity in a time of knowledge democracy and second modernity, or will it devalue and
discourage change?
6.2 Differentiating Change, Transition and Transformation
The discourse on sustainable development seems to use the terms transition,
transformation and change more or less synonymously. A more differentiated
view however, might help to understand the different characteristics of events
and what transformative governance is (or could be) about.
From the above mentioned terms, change is the least specific. It is used to signal
that there is something happening, that we know about this, and that we should take
action to better understand what is going on. An example of this is climate change
or demographic change. Change can mean anything; this term does not denote
going in a direction which is better or worse. Sometimes, the term change agent is
used to characterise an attitude of people. An example of this would be in the
business sector or in a civil society which empowers other people to act in their
own, unrestricted way, but along the pre-set and collective lines.
Transition, I suggest, should be used for pre-defined processes which are
designed to lead from A to B. The access of countries to the European Union is a
good example. A full acceptance of the Aquis Communautaire, the rules and
regulations the European Union has built up, can only be accessed during a (from
country to country different) certain period of time. This time can be called
transition time. Transition is a regulatory administrative action, driven by targets
and timetables (tartim).
Transformation is a term we may speak of when point A is concretely known,
whereas the goal in point B cannot be described in the same concrete way.
Quantitative targets are used as orientation and benchmarks; the most high profile
objective being to keep the global climate change lower than an additional 2C in
global mean temperature (WBGU 2011). There is also no clear final end or stage of
transformative action. Action is mostly driven by programs and measures (promes).
Another example is the current world’s financial debt crisis combined with
destabilising characteristics of the global financial market which are out of control.
Added to these is the transformative process which the globally leading currencies
find themselves submitted to. Another example is the so called Green Economy.
This is part of the private sector which is deliberatively changing the business case
by taking up sustainability solutions, changing gear and performance, or even
developing completely new business models (World Business Council for Sustain-
able Development 2010). It is characterised by the fact that the green part of the
economy is increasing, but remains far too small to exert dominating power.
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Conversely, the conventional part of the economy is still in command although does
not seem to be in a position to deliver ways and means which could respond
successfully to the crisis of a non sustainable globalised economy.
In other words, change is what we find ourselves in, more or less constantly,
without being formally invited. A transition is something which is set up to
technically manage a process in order to get from A to B. Transformation marks
a way for society to reflexively monitor opportunities and urges in order to
formulate decisions. Emergencies may be conceived as a lens which is clustering
all of these processes, bringing about a repertoire of action that takes choices and
has the openness to change the logic of action.
6.3 TINA Is Not a Friend
From a governance point of view, the most problematic notion is expressed by the
acronym TINA. It means ‘There-Is-No-Alternative’. The German debate on
whether and how to phase out nuclear energy, in essence, is a debate on the choices
the society must make in order to come up with alternative, safe energy supply
structures (including the demand side, the grid, and most certainly including the
informed debate of conflicts of interest regarding costs, climate emissions,
dependencies, and so on).
Political decisions can hardly rely on textbook protocol-type solutions if being
taken in times of crisis. Obviously, there is a certain urge to defend decisions by
arguing that there is no alternative. The no-alternative narrative nourishes the
popular expectation that ‘things have to go on’, and however disruptive an impact
might have been, it will not disturb the way of life. This has recently been used in
the course of the financial and economic crisis when decisions regarding bail-out
options had to be taken (too-big-to-fail or too-big-to-save?). TINA pretends linear
steadiness where there is substantial change. Thus, the notion of ‘there is no
alternative’ reproduces its own precondition, defines everything else as not realistic,
and accepts this makeup reality as a limitation on development. Most of the
governance features which are in operation today are TINA-related. They are
designed for permanence in a non-disruptive development. Even the specific
governance elements recently called upon by political strategies towards sustain-
able development are characterised by linearity in this respect. These elements
consist of management by quantitative objectives, verification by indicators, man-
agement rules, and involvement of stakeholders. They are characterised by an
understanding of ‘time’ as a steady and linear resource. There are no provisions
made for sudden and unexpected breaking up of social structures, or emergencies.
While these governance features are both necessary and relevant in order to respond
adequately to the systemic pressure of non sustainable trends, they are incomplete
because they deny the existence of change clusters.
Besides the continued pressure from long term systemic patterns of non sustain-
able production and consumption or from the emission of green house gases, other
sources of pressure might add to change clusters. In particular, environmental,
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nuclear, or financial emergencies are clustering change: all of a sudden they are
erratic, discontinued, and forcefully sporadic, with turnover capacity. From the
European industrial transformation period of the nineteenth century as well as the
realm of the environmental agenda since 1972, we have seen many examples of
accidents, unforeseen impacts, chemical spills, and contaminations. The images of
burning landfills, oil on rivers with fish stock floating belly up, abandoned industrial
sites, cut away rain forest, arable land turned into desert and soil loss, carry with
them iconographic power. Equally powerful are the metaphors of silent spring, the
ozone hole, or the extinction of species.
Major disasters and emergencies underline the fact that nothing is without an
alternative. The 2011 nuclear accident in Fukushima reminds us that unexpected
events and irregularities can happen even if they are clearly beyond what a
‘rational’ risk calculation can predict. Nuclear accidents and meltdowns are peak
events, but basically, they represent a number of emergencies which high-tech
societies find themselves confronted with.
In order to sustain a planet with nine billion people who stress the environment
and the natural resources, mankind must invent a number of alternatives. While the
pursuit of the old myth of economic growth is deteriorating societies and the
ecology, the alternative is not. The greening of society is a license to growth,
provided growth strategies are informed and guided by the notion of sustainability.
Learning from emergencies should enrich the governance debate on how to achieve
sustainability.
6.4 Conventional Versus High End Emergencies
The first industrialisation has brought about many emergencies such as explosions
of steam machines, railway disasters, mining catastrophes and technical
dysfunctions of all sorts. The ‘frontiers’ (Osterhammel 2010) have been exploited
as an unlimited reservoir of resources, both in the ‘new world’ and in the old world.
The notion that the extent of danger and risk can be calculated and reduced to the
minimum, is still true for commonplace accidents such as exploding steam
machines or discharges of hazardous substances. During the industrialisation,
these conventional types of accidents and emergencies led to an incremental
improvement of technologies and to advancing liability schemes and concepts for
insurance coverage. Unconventional ‘high end’ emergencies however, such as
adverse effects of climate change and geoengineering, ocean degradation, or
nuclear meltdowns, are impacting man and nature. There seem to be no immediate
limits on these emergencies which have irreversible impacts and the potential to
develop follow up impacts beyond control. These emergencies do not stop at
borders, they are not linear, and they are beyond the scope of existing governance.3
3 The contingency of emergencies is being neglected by mainstream research into governance.
It should be noted that one won’t find the term ‘emergency’ on http://bit.ly/rUTSsY
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However, a crucial but absent measure is an analysis of how irregularities as
expressed by emergencies relate to the governance of change and transformation.
An example of this would be during the time of the first and second industrialisation
(Br€uggemeier 1996).
Today, we are faced with the increasing probability of environmental
emergencies. However, these are different to the emergencies which we have
come to expect. The industrial style emergencies of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were ready-to-control, in the sense that the impact could be contained and
controlled. In the following years machinery was improved and procedures adapted.
While conventional emergencies still occur in contemporary times, another type
of emergency is characterised by non-controllability. Examples of such
emergencies are the impacts of nuclear hazards, climate migration, or food
disasters. In addition, the examples of major flooding show that the increased
vulnerability of human settlements tends to develop natural disasters into social
emergencies. It is debatable whether a financial mega crisis such as the financial
meltdown of 2008/2009 can be categorised as a high end emergency. Ulrich Beck
analyses the delimited and social character of risks in what he calls the second
modernity (Beck 1986, 2009).
The definition of risk as a product of likelihood of occurrence and scale of
damage is conventional. There are risks (and emergencies) which are beyond this
definition, because they are highly complex, the magnitude of impact is beyond
being calculable and/or they are on a global scale. This challenges the conventional
concept of risk and the way these risks have been dealt with. Not knowing (in the
sense of absence of positive information) as well as deliberate ignorance and denial
are forming part of modern risks (Table 6.1).
The appearance of extended risks alone is an important change of course.
Adding to this, a growing number of emergencies can be expected in the future
stemming from the fact that more and more people live in areas which are subject to
extremely vulnerable conditions. Another contributing factor is the deteriorating
pressure on food and ecosystem services, a factor which is on the increase. Another
reason comes with the embedded runaway risks of accidents in nuclear facilities.
As demonstrated in Fukushima, a major nuclear dysfunction may cause response
action which is far beyond that which is expected and possibly far beyond what is
eco-nomically and ecologically maintainable.
It must be understood that not each and every environmental problem causes an
emergency. In legal terms, a situation is called an emergency when it places man
and nature at immediate harm or a risk, which is not tolerable. This impact is of
such a dimension that it must be immediately addressed regardless of whether it is
expectable, foreseeable or otherwise predicted or not predicted.
Table 6.1 Types of emergencies
Nineteenth and twentieth century style emergencies High end emergencies
R-2-C (Ready to Control),
accessible for insurance
S-b-L (Systemic beyond Limits),
not pre-calculable
Triggering selective learning
(if not wasted to oblivion)
Clustering collective change processes
(if not wasted to oblivion)
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The term emergency is special because of its legal consequence. As it has thus
far been applied, it legitimises and enforces ‘illiberal’ intervention. An emergency
legitimises (and requires) governments to directly and immediately intervene.
Emergency response will not worry about vested interests such as property rights
or facility permits. There is always a momentum of urgency involved. A good role
model is the Emergency Response Action carried out under the US Superfund
legislation. There are also emergency response routines in Europe which are mostly
carried out on the national level by police or army, and by specialised branches of
the fire department.
The term emergency is often synonymously used with the concept of ‘danger’.
This is relevant in a broader sense. Some environmental damages stipulate a danger
for humans; others do not (yet). Globally, the man-earth system and the biocapacity
are under stress. Increased stress means that the occurrence of emergencies is more
probable. Thus, deteriorated and restricted or even denied access to fresh water, fish
stock, or food security, and a depletion of sources, may develop into regional
emergencies. This assumption is based on knowledge. There is no point in ‘crying
wolf’ or producing gloom and doom messages, but there is also no point in denying
this trend.
6.5 Framing Future
The year 2050 is near. Those who will occupy your positions and assume your
functions as leaders in sustainability are sitting in our schools and universities. The
40 years leading up to 2050 will mark 40 years of their lives as active members of
society, of their business and family life, and of their life in social and local
communities. By 2050, the world will look very different, with nine billion people
living on it, all with high consumption standards. This world will be resource-
constrained, carbon-constrained, and will exhibit profoundly changed geopolitics.
It is abundantly clear that governance will be key. The more this is the case, the
more the world will care about how to share the ever-increasing wealth of available
scientific knowledge. Knowledge and democracy – along with accountability and
transparency – are the building blocks for governance.
The European approaches (EU COM 2011) currently brought into play in
preparing the 2012 UNCSD, reflect the political dynamics of the European project.
For hundreds of years Europe was a byword for permanent war. The European
Union, emanating from lessons learned, is a peace project. It is run on a machinery
of hard and soft regulation, and builds administrative institutions in collectively-
shared responsibility. Still, it is incomplete, and the project continually struggles
with how to free up multilateral action and how to link national and European
action. In a sense, the story of Europe can be seen as the story of how to integrate
diverse views, habits, drivers and cultures.
Europe has learned that ‘integration’ does not work because good instruments
are in place, but instead works on a ‘must do’ basis designed to achieve collective
goals and objectives. The enlargement of the European Union and the specific
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processes of accession are a good case in point. The European carbon reduction
objectives and the long-term goals of the European Union are further examples.
They work through strong administrative arrangements, be them legal or commu-
nicative, enforced or implemented, voluntarily or on the basis of persuasive
instruments. Having established this, it will likely come as no surprise to learn
that the EU and Germany, of course, are strongly supportive of the idea of
upgrading UNEP and promoting UNEP to the status of specialised agency. In a
wider sense, it seems necessary to realign the performance of the UN system with
the agenda of sustainability. An umbrella organisation approach seems to be
reasonable. The underlying understanding of this position is one of integration
and the role that organisation building can play in this respect.
In the UN system, an upgraded UNEP would have to serve as a core element in
order to re-integrate environment. International environmental governance, after
Rio 1992, seems to have been running in disintegration mode. Additional tasks
have been implemented by adding new organisations to the existing ones. The
re-unification of the environmental case resembles a piece of homework that is
needed to reach out and improve the integration of the environment in the wider
task of sustainability and into the Bretton Woods instruments.
• In this respect, the Green Economy poses particular challenges and opportunities.
Environmental policies must and can deliver benchmarks and guidelines for
roadmapping the green economy. Roadmaps are required and must be moulded
into new governance instruments. They are needed in order to tackle upcoming
agenda items such as the launch of a recycling exercise for those materials which
today are not recycled at all (e.g. rare earth, industrial metals). Roadmaps provide
an opportunity to design solutions beyond one-point-regulations.
• Best practice examples may create new ways of thinking and reach agreed
objectives (EEAC 2011). Award schemes are best suited to provide a competi-
tive level playing field that may serve for collective sharing of approaches
avoiding window dressing from happening and delivering benchmarks for
progress (Deutscher Nachhaltigkeitspreis 2008–2011). Peer Review processes
may help to benchmark best practice approaches, and to prevent the green
economy from developing into exclusive partiality.
• Enforcing capacity building (sustainability skills) and the involvement of the
private sector. Business and civil society already play important roles in the
transition process towards sustainable development. There are good examples
for changing gear, developing new business models, and re-arranging the supply
chains by taking sustainability criteria on board. It is for civil society and politics
to draw the line and to make progress and success towards the green transition
more tangible. Councils for Sustainable Development can make a difference, as
demonstrated by the German example of awarding sustainability performance,
ranking efforts, and the dialogue-style elaboration of a German Sustainability
Code (Rat f€urNachhaltigeEntwicklung 2011).
A more visioning governance debate should also cover the aspect of fiscal
sustainability, an aspect which all-too-often is completely neglected. However,
without any (near-stable) fiscal sustainability, virtually none of the remaining
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approaches to sustainability will ever come to fruition. By the same token, imple-
mentation of a green economy must prove that it will deliver innovation and decent
jobs as well as qualitatively justifiable growth, and that it can alleviate poverty
(Bachmann 2010).
Change rarely comes from within organisations. This, at least, is true of the
concept of organisations as we have come to know them. In addition, it is undoubt-
edly true that the UN system has so far, not been able to mainstream the sustain-
ability task.
For this reason, the governance debate should highlight the nexus between
national and multilateral action. With regard to making the nexus between national
and sub-national levels viable, and working towards promoting sustainable devel-
opment action, National Sustainable Development Councils in European Member
states have proven very meaningful and have enabled a broad set of different
procedures in governance, and between the public and private sector. For this,
multi stakeholder bodies are a good proxy. ‘International Environmental Gover-
nance’ and ‘Institutional Framework on Sustainable Development’ should encom-
pass also the private sector. If the notion of Green Economy is to be taken for real
the governance debate should reflect this. Judging from the German experience, the
corporate community (the most advanced part of it, that is) already displays a
number of approaches and governance features designed to mainstream ‘Sustain-
able Development’ into corporate performance and to distinguish those efforts from
mere window-dressing.
In general, the governance debate may gain momentum when it begins to
combine administrative, corporate governance, and the governance of social respon-
sibility, and when it takes trajectories into account that are driven by emergency
responses. With the concept of the green economy, this step seems compulsory.
6.6 Emergency and Emergency Response
6.6.1 A Knowledge Case
The notion of an environmental emergency associates a knowledge base with the
legal right (and contingency) which allows for an enlarged set of interventions, a so
called emergency response. The conceptual framework of environmental policies is
deeply rooted in dealing with and learning from emergencies, although systematic
descriptions of environmentalism tend to dismiss and replace event-enforced
learnings by more theory grounded cases of environmental policies (Speth 2005;
WBCSD 2010; Radkau 2011). Historically, emergency response action was one of
the prime ‘sources’ of environmentalism, some of those emergencies have been of
national significance and required extensive coordination among government
agencies in order to prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.
Mostly, responding to emergencies requires immediate action such as shutting
down ongoing operations, on site access to facilities and (mostly) emissions
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discharges and any other law enforcement activities. Emergency response allows
for the most effective action providing it is bound to the goal of taking control of an
otherwise harmful situation. These actions may deliberately not be constrained by
any previously issued emission right or discharge permission. In an extremely
dangerous situation there must be no legal limit to site access.
What qualifies as an environmental issue, to be handled as an emergency, is
subject to intense debate and profound scientific research. In the context of human
toxicology for example, the research focuses on dangerous substances, hazardous
substances, exposure pathways, dose–response systems, interpolation from test data
and field evidence, and linkages with human disposition.
The notion of emergencies stipulates a burden of proof. It must be proven that a
dangerous situation can lead to concrete harm for people or the environment.
Furthermore, the dangerous situation may not be ‘only’ some kind of general
(abstract) event which may or may not put people and the environment at unac-
ceptable risk. There are different metrics being used to prove this, all of which are
linked to high-end scientific measurement and verification of the evidence:
• Direct measurements (if direct measurement is ethically acceptable and techni-
cally possible, however this is seldom the case);
• Epidemiological proof (given the population at risk is large enough in number to
calculate the statistics [and to separate a concrete add-on harm from what is
perceived as circumstantial or normal risk given the way of life, the terms of
operational security, or the ubiquitous background situation]);
• Extrapolation from appropriate field experience given that there is an analogy in
the first place;
• Circumstantial evidence such as open burning of hazardous material, evidence
of uncontrolled explosives, dead fish stock.
The use of a single metric may not be ruled out. However, it is safe to assume
that a combination of these metrics is often used (Bhopal, Love Canal, cases of
dioxin spills, children’s blood lead levels associated with urban outdoor activities,
major cases of groundwater pollution in the US and in Germany, the dangerous
exposure to toxics in residential areas that have been built right on top of hazardous
waste dumpsites). Combining metrics is a clear choice whenever uncertainties are
great, predicted costs for remediation are high, and more people are directly
affected (health, mortality).
6.6.2 The Metrics of Adverse Effects and Danger
as Scientific Challenge
Environmental governance as expressed by, for example, international regulations
and discourse on the International Environmental Governance, has not yet pro-
foundly touched on the case of emergencies. Emergency response action is left to
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national governments. Following this subsidiary approach, the otherwise well
designed research into climate forcing and environmental depletion is not yet linked
to the work profile of emergency response and its operational engineering expertise
where they exist.
• The most important indicator characterising the state of climate change is given
as global mean temperature. Being highly aggregated, it cannot stipulate or even
trigger any emergency response measure which responds to the regional impacts
of dangerous climate change. This is not coherent.
• What is globally modeled and predicted (the global mean temperature, the global
biocapacity, food supply) is not connected to emergencies clusters which require
evidence, measurement, reporting, and verification.
• The term ‘damage’ as in damage thresholds, has been defined in many respects
as public health policies4 and environmental protection. The Commission on the
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, the so-called
Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission, prominently supports this point (Stiglitz
et al. 2009; Rat f€urNachhaltigeEntwicklung, Gesch€aftsstelle 2010). The Com-
mission believes that it is necessary to have indicators that designate thresholds
which, when exceeded, give rise to concerns that harmful environmental damage
will occur. In particular the Commission emphasises a need for a clear indicator
pointing out dangerous levels of environmental damage.
Fundamental questions of knowledge, certainty and burden of proof arise in this
context. They demand scientific research into the effects of environmental pollution
as well as on the political and conceptual approach to evidence-based decisions.
The definition of a danger correlates to damage. Damage is not a given minor
impairment, disruption or inconvenience, but is a serious and unacceptable
impairment or burden which is currently happening or for which there is sufficient
probability that it will occur. Sufficient probability does not in itself denote a
certainty that damage will directly occur; then again, the mere abstract possibility
of damage occurring does not warrant the fundamental assumption of danger.
Instead, there must be a well-founded concern that the danger will materialise,
for example by virtue of a dangerous situation arising if existing trends are allowed
to continue unhampered.
4 For example in assessing dangers to public health or human working conditions the critical end
point is seen as being an adverse effect that can be traced back to the exposure to a specific
contaminant. The damage threshold is largely uniformly defined at the international level. It is
determined by impact-related body doses that indicate either no-effect levels, no-observed
adverse-effect levels, the lowest observed adverse effect level or any other (barely) tolerable,
reabsorbed doses of pollutants. In terms of their definition, methods for derivation and inter-
polation and the level of protection associated with one of the levels those reference levels
are largely stipulated by the World Health Organisation (WHO) or other organisations
such as the Environmental Protection Agency in the USA. With regard to carcinogenic effects,
statistical probabilities of occurrence are generally considered to be the threshold values (Eikmann
et al. 2010).
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Warding off danger is linked to the idea of preventing emergencies from
happening. This is the purpose of the precautionary principle.5 As the guiding
principle of international declarations such as the 1987 Montreal Protocol, the
third North Sea Conference of 1990, as well as the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED)
of 1992 the principle is also entrenched in the EU’s legal basic documents
and various European action programmes. The aim of the precautionary principle
is to conserve natural resources and livelihoods in order to preserve their value,
efficiency and functions in the long term. A key characteristic of precautionary
measures is that often, neither the probability of occurrence nor the extent of
damage is specifically known or quantifiable. The IPCC introduces the terminology
‘robust findings’ (IPCC 2007) and ‘key uncertainties’, in order to ascertain how
much secured knowledge (certainty) is available on the impact of the damage.
In other words, how reliably a detrimental impact threshold in a protected property
is indicated (forecast).
6.6.3 The Case of Climate Emergency
In 2011 the Security Council finally issued the long debated statement on the
possible security implications of climate change.6 The Security Council notes that
in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security under its
consideration, conflict analysis and contextual information on, inter alia, possible
security implications of climate change is important, when such issues are drivers
of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or
endanger the process of consolidation of peace. The Security Council expresses its
5 In German environmental policy, this concept has been broached by introducing a soil protection
law (Bodenschutz-Recht) (Cf. German Government 2000).
6 At the 6587th meeting of the Security Council, held on 20 July 2011, in connection with the
Council’s consideration of impact of climate change under the item entitled ‘Maintenance of
international peace and security’, Ambassador Peter Wittig as acting President of the Security
Council made a statement on behalf of the Council on the substance of security implications of
climate change. Beforehand, the Security Council debate had not reached a consensus. In April
2007, the British government initiated a Security Council debate on climate change as a security
risk. If climate change was a threat to international security, intervention by the United Nations
should be legitimate. While the British initiative was supported by the European Union and the
majority of its Member States, the U.S., G77, China and Russia opposed it. Especially India
expressed its worries fearing that acknowledging climate change as a security risk would open the
floodgates for industrialised countries to circumvent the sovereignty principle of the UN Charta.
In particular they opposed any attempt to widening the interpretation of the application of Chap. 7
of the Charta. The definition of emergency seems to be a crucial argument anyway. The represen-
tative of Russia to the UN appealed to ‘avoid panicking and overdramatising the situation’ and the
representatives of Brazil, Pakistan, and China emphasised that climate change is foremost a
sustainable development issues. Thus, sudden emergencies due to climate change are meant to
be kept outside of the political debate.
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concern that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run,
aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security such as
water scarcity, desertification of arable land, food crisis and flooding. The Security
Council also expresses its concern that possible security implications of loss of
territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small
low-lying island states.
With this statement, the Security Council recognises the potential threat of
climate change to international peace and security. In this regard, the Council
requests the Secretary-General to ensure that his reporting to the Council contains
such contextual information, in particular on climate change and its possible
security implications and future generations, connecting to recent academic
debates. Defining emergency in the context of climate change is crucial for political
action. The debate thus far reveals both scientific and political uncertainty regard-
ing climate change impacts. ‘Trans-governmental’ approaches are needed to assess
and handle climate emergencies. This is the point that the following case scheme
seems to suggest.
Climate protection has been the subject of lengthy discussions. It is agreed that
greenhouse gas emissions shall be reduced to such an extent that the global mean
value of global warming does not rise by any more than 2C as compared to the pre-
industrial level. This threshold is the response currently given to the question
arising from the objectives of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change:
human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases [. . .] and that this will result on average an additional warming of the
Earth surface and atmosphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.
Consequently, the question is: where is the limit that differentiates harm and
harmful effects from undesirable, but not yet harmful effects? In the context of
climate protection, the so-called 2C target represents a preliminary response
(Luhmann 2010). The term ‘emergency’ has only surfaced in the last 2 years,
with its main purpose to underscore and legitimate the 2C goal as a critical
level. Once surpassed, this level is believed to trigger all kinds of follow-up
reactions which can lead to all kinds of adverse impacts. There are difficulties
and uncertainties in determining sensitivity,7 regional impacts, vulnerability and
long term impacts.
7Weitzmann especially argues that it remains difficult to narrow-down the probability density
function of climate sensitivities. In this context, climate sensitivity is understood as ‘the equilib-
rium mean surface temperature response to a doubling of atmospheric CO2’. As a consequence,
Weitzmann emphasised that ‘some very few but very important real-world situations have
potentially unlimited exposure due to structural uncertainty about their potentially open-ended
catastrophic reach’. (Weitzmann 2009). In order to circumvent the difficulty in determining the
exact correlation of mean global temperature, climate sensitivities and emergency situation, the
point of intervention could be shifted to multiple interventions on a regional level. This could not
only strengthen national and regional acceptance for climate policy. It could also be more adequate
to prevent DAI.
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In politics, the 2C target is conceived as a mostly scientific finding; scientists
treat this objective as a mostly political matter (M€uller-Jung 2009).8 A comparable,
concretely defined damage threshold for other problems such as soil, nutrition basis,
natural resources and biodiversity is not yet available.
The objective of the UNFCCC 1992 is to prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference (DAI).9 Article 1 speaks of the ‘adverse effects of climate change’
meaning changes in the physical environment or biota resulting from climate
change. The legal language of UNFCCC refers to a level of climate change
which may have significant deleterious effects, and establishes the ultimate goal
of the international community to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
from taking place.
The mean global temperature is the one and only point of intervention10 that the
international climate policy community has agreed upon so far. This does not match
the requirement of UNFCCC to show an adverse effect and help to prevent DAI.
Preventing DAI from occurring will require more than just one point of intervention
because disruptions and catastrophes are bound to the regional and local level.
A multi-point intervention approach would better match the regulatory require-
ment. It would endorse a set of national/regional points of intervention which would
refer to factors such as permafrost and glaciers, regional concentration of black
carbon, and changes in natural habitats (migration of vegetation zones) which are
faster than natural attenuation.11
The question of which impact might qualify for a DAI has not yet attracted
enough attention, neither in the sector of policy making nor in the scientific
discourse. The language found in key papers on climate research varies a great
deal and does not provide clear terminology. The terms ‘adverse’, ‘dangerous’,
‘significantly deleterious’, ‘serious and/or irreversible consequences’ and
‘harmful’, are used synonymously. This may be interpreted as blur. In its Third
Assessment Report, the IPCC acknowledges the difficulty to define a DAI:
The basis for determining what constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ will
vary among regions, depending both on the local nature and consequences of climate
change impacts. (IPCC 2001; Schneider et al 2007; Weitzmann 2009)
8 Translation from ‘Politiker haben es (das 2C-Ziel) wie ein wissenschaftliches Ergebnis
behandelt, Wissenschaftler als eine politische Angelegenheit’ by Jaeger, Carlo and Julia Jaeger;
as cited by Joachim M€uller-Jung: Warum sollten maximal zwei Grad die Welt retten? Die große
Zielmarke der Umweltpolitik ist keine Erfindung der Klimaforscher. Ihre Erfindung kam eher
zuf€allig zustande und liegt drei Jahrzehnte zur€uck. Potsdamer Forscher erz€ahlen erstmals die
Geschichte http://bit.ly/ohP8hV
9Article two of the UNFCCC sets out the Convention’s objective.
10 A point of intervention is defined by an environmental quality that ultimately signals that action
is required. Examples: lead levels in children’s blood (1980th), PCB in arctic wildlife birds’ egg.
11 It is well understood that this indicator alone has to be well referenced, which is not the purpose
of this paper.
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It is debatable whether an aggregated indicator such as a global mean tempera-
ture can possibly be used as a trigger for emergency response measures.12 These
impacts, however, react to significantly different vulnerabilities. Large-scale, irre-
versible and systemic changes in geophysical systems may vary in kind, geographic
dimension, and time.
Key security risks are pointing to indirect reinforcing effects of climate change,
namely border disputes and migration due to incrementally changing landmasses,
energy supply due to increases in competition over scarce energy resources, increased
shortages of other resources such as freshwater supply, and societal stress through an
aggravation of poverty and inequalities through climate change or even unforeseen
impacts of deliberate climate engineering. One key security risk relates to humani-
tarian crisis in the case of extreme weather events and sudden disruptive climate
change. The Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015,13 provides some guidance
as to the actions which should be taken in response to major natural disasters.
All countries fear that unilaterally defining emergency will undermine their
sovereignty. In general, differentiating ordinary problems and accidents from
dangerous effects and even from emergencies, is an open question. This is true
for climate change as well as for nuclear meltdowns, and the social and infrastruc-
tural impacts which may follow from major natural disasters. What is the degree of
evidence that is substantial enough to legitimate any external intervention? Is there
such a degree anyway? Who would be in the position to clarify different
viewpoints?14 Who would be legitimised to check data, to detect undisclosed
data, and to ask for missing metrics? How do independency, reliability, and (!)
12 In the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC this is especially dealt with in Chap. 19 of WG II
where it says: ‘A significant category of key vulnerabilities is associated with large-scale,
irreversible and systemic changes in geophysical systems. [. . .] central to nearly all the
assessments of key vulnerabilities is the need to improve knowledge of climate sensitivity –
particularly in the context of risk management [. . .] where the greatest potential for key impacts
lies’ (IPCC AR4, WGII, Chap. 19: 804).
13 The Hyogo Framework for Action is the main document resulting from the World Conference
on Disaster Reduction in January 2005.
14 Detached from the debate in the Security Council, there exists the idea to widen the interpreta-
tion of Chap. 7 of the UN Charta by establishing the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) as legal norm
in international law. While the concept has been on the agenda for some time now, an initiative by
the former Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, to establish the R2P was not entirely
successful. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued
from the perspective of the concerned population. They recommended establishing the following
criteria to legitimate intervention: ‘right intention’, ‘last resort’, ‘proportional means’, and ‘rea-
sonable prospects’. However, the World Summit in 2005 including the high-level preparatory
panel took up a different perspective. To them, the main purpose of R2P was to strengthen the
international security systems (instead of taking the perspective of the concerned population). In
the final document, R2P was taken up. But it was not attached to any criteria. Especially the US
wanted to keep a leeway for wide interpretation of intervention. However, intervention was limited
by the definition of four cases of application, namely genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing, and
crime against humanity. Crisis due to natural disasters have deliberately been excluded. While
‘responsibility to protect’ has been confirmed in the sense it was already established in interna-
tional law, no ‘right to protect’ has been established.
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effectiveness in handling data build up credibility? Is the process of verification part
of the solution or part of the problem?
6.7 Transformation and Governance
The term transformation often suggests big machinery and rightly so. The term
associates itself with big challenges and ‘thinking-big-solutions’. Its agenda is
bigger than life. It forces the followers to be part of something bigger. People
generally like this as it does not contradict with what they would do anyway.
The term is used in singular form since it has been used by Polanyi (1978, 1944).
This evokes the idea of a simple solution (a pass-partout thing, a one-way option).
The term somewhat excludes those who are actually carrying out transformation.
It invokes passiveness. A rhetoric example: If there is a revolution, there are
revolutioners. This is not the case with transformation. Who would actually do
the transformation? Transformationers? A Transformateur?
The term suggests, in a way, some kind of ‘Big – Bang-ism’ where development
constantly needs and provides a sense of scale (something is scaling up). The era of
sustainability proposes proportionality rather than scale as major references. Trans-
formation, probably, has no scaling mechanism at all. Learning from historial
analyses of the first and second industrial revolution one may extract some features
of transformation that might give an idea of what the world is running into with
thriving towards nine billion people with increased life support systems
(Osterhammel 2010; IASS 2011). Discontinuity, purposelessness, locality seem to
be such kind of patterns. There are specific elements of transformation which we
must know about and must accept: how to enhance credibility? There is no way to
force other stakeholders (those responsible) to do something without the next step
being performed by the original self (there is no free meal). How to build trust into
‘green economy’ when there is no trust in economy? How to ensure the reversibility
of the good action?
6.8 Transgovernance
Ulrich Beck’s concept of second modernity expects the old institutions, enterprises
and players to remain in place while the new happens. Change, in this sense, is not
sequential but rather happens through parallel channels and competitive structures.
There is little doubt that the occurrence of emergencies will increase. Indeed
with up to nine billion people living on a planet with carbon constraints and
restricted resources, in 2050 the human settlements will be more vulnerable. As a
runaway problem with a ‘fat tail’ the climate change will cause a number of
emergency situations. Nuclear facilities are also a potential threat. The recent
nuclear meltdown in Japan has prompted profound and renewed thinking about
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the ethics of how much risk a society can bear and whether the idea of risk is still
adequate if no society is in the position to simply absorb social distortion by
evacuating densely populated areas, dealing with contaminations and, last but not
least, with an un-clearly lurking emergency situation arising from not controlling
the nuclear power plants.
This think piece is not setting out to emphasise emergencies per se as some kind
of change making mechanism. Emergencies may catalyse change as they can lead
to stand still behaviour. Their political impact is open ended, and we can see
examples which have stirred a renaissance style follow up, when the way an entity
(society, enterprise, organisation) ‘digests’ an emergency is trying to rest orate
behaviour. Change is not symmetric in time or thoroughness. Rather, it is asym-
metric, and this is why there is the case for advanced studies to better understand
change and the change as clustered by and in emergency situations. This depends on
the responsiveness of democracy and how democracies digest knowledge, in
general and under the concrete contingency.
A preventive democracy, in fear of populist and the public debate demagogically
destroying forces, may choose to hide itself behind a shade of rules and ‘ever
existing’ procedures denying open political access and fighting change clusters as
irregularities which might pass by anyway if not given attention. It would choose to
rely on elitist groups of experts legitimised by function and routines. It will hardly
accept the perspective of transgovernance.
A flat democracy allows and invites social media and networks of all kinds to
directly influence decision-making schemes. It is amorphous and will refrain from
taking sides. ‘Flat’ means that, technically, access is granted to everyone. It may not
be media-controlled in the sense of the private sector owning newspapers and
tv-channels. It may rather invite market players and especially consumers to act
as a crowd and to use demand side power in order to enforce sustainability features
in production, product and consumption. Key words and concepts are ‘responsible
consumption, lifestyle-of-heath-and-sustainability, political consumption, carrot
mobs, green procurement’. While these elements may enlarge and improve demo-
cracy, a flat democracy is likely to create the notion that those in charge are
increasingly alienated from those who run the action on the ground, and maybe
this is really the case (Friedman 2008). Seen from a governance perspective, a flat
democracy may tend to let governance structure fade away. It replaces procedures
by presence. Procedures with checks and balances would then be replaced by the
direct influence of leaders who may have no legitimate voice other than through the
web-crowd. A flat democracy may even choose to deliberately discard legitimised
representative procedures (and their legal derivates, the sitting and permitting
procedures) by allowing and enforcing social networks and populist ‘leadership’
appearances. A transgovernmental perspective will probably be seen as something
that is alienated from the flat democracy.
A representative parliamentary democracy that would increase its responsive
and participatory lay out options could be called ‘transdemocracy’. Building on
both procedures and preferences it would count on the democratic lifestyle and
social responsibility of people and institutions. It would enlarge legal procedures
not by consuming even more time and resources, but by making legal access easier
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and legal procedures faster. It would clearly not be fail-proof, but by not wasting
mistakes for the incremental improvement of the governance approach it will build
fire walls against the democratic fatigue and as far as transformation is concerned,
against disappointment as well. This concept of democracy will most likely use
transgovernmental concepts to better deal with the unpredicted.
In this respect, governance issues, and transgovernance in particular, should also
cover the private sector. The corporate community displays different governance
approaches for the implementation of sustainability management schemes and
addressing social responsibility. Indeed this is a long standing agenda which the
private sector and the civil society including the nongovernmental organisations,
have in common.15
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